The subject matter of this paper is the interplay of the female body, law and the technologies of ''domestic'' animals 
Introduction: Animals before the Law
Though the title of this section alludes to Cary Wolfe's 2012 book, the purpose of the paper is not to read human and nonhuman animals in the context of modern biopolitics, but to discuss the parallels between a criminalised, convicted woman and specific animals in Hannah Kent's acclaimed debut novel Burial Rites (2013) . While the patriarchal traditions of discursive and practical linking of women with animals/nature for the sake of domination and exploitation have been well documented and examined by ecofeminists (see Merchant 1990 , Gaard 1993 , Sandilands 1999 , Mies and Shiva 2014 , the central argument in this paper is that these parallels become particularly pronounced in the twin contexts of the nineteenth-century European death penalty and the technologies of so-called ''domestic'' animals 2 . Following Foucault and Wolfe, by these technologies we understand the practices of discursive and material production of ''domestic'' animals -the housing, feeding, transportation and breeding practices; those covered by the term "slaughter''; and the linguistic interventions which normalise and naturalise them to such a degree that animals become ''absent referents'' (Adams 2010:13) .
The novel is biofiction based on a historical person, Agnes
Magnusdottir, the last woman ever to be executed in Iceland, in 1830. A protagonist and one of the novel's narrators, Agnes is at the moment of her execution 34, having spent all her life as a ''landless workmaid raised on a porridge of moss and poverty'' (Kent 2013:52) in a patriarchal, carnist and materialistic society. Agnes was sentenced to death for the 1828 murder of her former employer and lover, Natan Ketilsson, and his guest, Petur
Jonsson. Two other people were involved as accomplices: 15-year-old Sigga and her fiancé Fridrik Sigurdsson. While Sigga received clemency, Fridrik too was executed. Conceived and realised, for the most part, as Agnes's deeply personal, poetic and poignant confession that reveals the woman's essential innocence, the novel represents a genealogy of the criminalisation of poverty and the legal animalisation of a human being -that is, the transference of the aforementioned technologies of ''domestic'' animals onto a human (female) body in a legal context.
On the subject of the animalisation of a human being before the law, the novel, therefore, does not merely examine the tradition of discursively associating criminals with ''animals'' and ''beasts'' (see Olson 2013) ; it draws clear parallels between the "mundane violence of everyday life'' (Wolfe 2012:10) directed at animals, ''domestic'' and otherwise, and the violence of the law that intersect on the convicted woman's body. From the moment the law touches her -and it only ever touches her to punishAgnes is still, or even more so, a body, but not necessarily a human being, despite her capacity for (poetic) language 3 : she becomes "too embodied but not quite human enough'' (Glover and Kaplan 2009:82) . The possibility of a human being stripped of human status through legal action points to human, as well as animal, as a construct and a (temporary) privilege. Kent, additionally, lays bare the role punitive law plays in demarcating the boundaries between human and animal, i.e. the power of the law to "make and unmake persons''(see Colin 2013) via punishment and death sentence.
Legally unmaking persons, the novel reveals, equals animalisation.
The animalisation of Agnes's law-touched body, moreover, is to be interpreted in two contexts, one of which is philosophical, the othereconomic-punitive. The woman sentenced to death embodies the unbreakable bonds between humans and animals, and those are physical vulnerability and mortality -but also killability (see Gillespie and Lopez 2015:1-13) . As Cora Diamond states:
The awareness we each have of being a living body, being 'alive to the world', carries with it exposure to the bodily sense of vulnerability to death, sheer animal vulnerability, the vulnerability we share with them. This vulnerability is capable of panicking us. To be able to acknowledge it at all, let alone as shared, is wounding; but acknowledging it as shared with other animals, in the presence of what we do to them, is capable not only of panicking one but also of isolating one… (quoted in Wolfe 2012:17) On the other hand, it is with the body that Agnes pays for her crime in "the pervasively economized field of suffering'' that, according to Nietzsche, proceeds from "debt and restitution" as "the primary framework for conceptualizing criminality and punishment'' where ''any injury is conceptualized as a debt, and every punishment understood as a payment'' (Butler 2014:31) . Paradoxically, it is this conceptualisation and realisation of human law that emphasises the difference between Agnes and "domestic'' animals, because unlike Agnes they have not committed any crime, nor are they recognised before the law: paradoxically, because the novel shows the operation of the law to lead to the increasing animalisation of the convicted woman, culminating in the execution by which Agnes is unquestionably reduced to a terrified animal brought by force to the axe.
Somewhat more narrowly, Agnes's body, the one she pays her debt with, is a female body, and the body of the servant who was directly involved with the production of food on all the farms at which she worked.
Here ''domestic'' animals figure not only the new social tendencies of rationalism/capitalism, prison is offered as both a more humane and a more effective punishment, as it supposedly removes the emphasis from the convicted body. According to Foucault, the focus of modern punitive measures is the convict's soul, which is to be altered, corrected and re-formed in keeping with social requirements -thus the soul, in his well-known expression, becomes "the prison of the body' ' (1995:28) .
Additionally,
[a]s a result of this new restraint, a whole army of technicians took over from the executioner, the immediate anatomist of pain: warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists, psychologists, educationalists; by their very presence near the prisoner, they sing the praises that the law needs: they reassure it that the body and pain are not the ultimate objects of its punitive action. (Foucault 1995:9) Though a chaplain plays a significant role in Burial Rites, Hannah Kent's novel refuses to sing such praises, emphasising the opposite: that it is precisely the body subjected to pain which is the target and the outcome of the supposedly corrective activities of laws, institutions and professionals.
Since the events behind the novel take place in the early nineteenth century, Agnes Magnusdottir's case indeed represents a transition from one form of punishment to the other, retaining the worst aspects of both. She is not punished by a prison sentence -at that time there were no prisons in Iceland -and her death is more medieval than modern: as opposed to distinctly modern executions that take place far away from the eyes of the public, usually at midnight and in prison basement facilities, Agnes is executed publicly, with a clear intention for her death to serve as a spectacle confirming "the absolute power of the law'' (Colin 2013) , or, arguably, the state's monopolisation of violence. The spectacle of Agnes's specific, human death, moreover, has a huge symbolic and educational potential as it not only graphically demonstrates the triumph of the law, state and civilisation, but also represents "an opportunity for our community to witness the consequences for grave misdemeanour'', as District
Commissioner Blöndal explains (Kent 2013:18) .
Despite the legal terminology, "grave misdemeanour'' refers not only to the murder, but also to that which is unsaid yet highly punishable:
deviation from the gender and class norms. Unlike Sigga, who is given clemency, being deemed "too young and sweet to die'' (42), Agnes is too intelligent, too old and does not possess girlish beauty like Sigga so as to be spared the axe. In fact, various characters in the novel comment that Blondal lets Sigga live because she reminds him of his wife, because she is beautiful and not too clever. Agnes, on the other hand, understands with bitterness that her obvious intellect is an additional (unstated) reason why Blondal wants to make an example of her, and why nobody believes that she was the victim of Natan's manipulation: "But they see I've got a head on my shoulders, and believe a thinking woman cannot be trusted. Believe there's no room for innocence'' (126). A punishment for a thinking woman with a head on her shoulders will be the cutting off of that head, after thorough animalisation.
Moreover, not only is thinking inappropriate to women in general, it is particularly punishable in poor women. In fact, education as an important class marker is policed by physical violence -at one point in the novel Agnes remembers how happy she was while preparing for Confirmation, because that was the only time she was not beaten by her master for reading. Indeed, the novel begins with a poetic voice which comes from a tortured body, in familiar ''domestic'' animal conditions. While she waits for a year in Stora-Borg for the trial to finish, Agnes is isolated, chained, in total darkness, without anyone to talk to her, still alive but … this is no life; waiting in darkness, in silence, in a room so squalid I have forgotten the smell of fresh air. The chamber pot is so full of my waste that it threatens to spill if someone does not come and empty it soon.
[…] They left me alone without a light and there was no means to measure the hours, no way to mark the day from night. Now I keep company with only the fetters about my wrists, the dirt floor, a dismantled loom, abandoned in the corner, an old broken handspindle. (20) Just like cows, pigs, calves that are "raised'' in similar conditions, tied up, in darkness, without any stimuli, and then labelled "dirty'' and "stupid'', Agnes is animalised too. It is obvious that this is not her nature, that "criminal'', just like "animal'', is a legal/social construct that is realised on The Stora-Borg men sometimes tie my legs together in the evening, as they do with the forelegs of horses, to ensure I will not run away. It seems that with each passing day I become more like an animal to them, another dull-eyed beast to feed with what can be scraped together and to be kept out of the weather. They leave me in the dark, deny me light and air, and when I must be moved, they bind and lead me where they will. They never speak to me here. (29) (30) When Agnes arrives at Kornsa, at the farm where she is to await the execution, the perspective shifts and instead of Agnes, it is Margret, the slaughter, then there is no need for them to be fed, to be given water or space to lie down comfortably: there is no need, either, for the time of transportation to be lengthened by allowing the animals to fulfil their physiological needs. Time is money; denying them all that is more economical. And it is exactly this word that Blondal uses while explaining his verdict: "This is why I decided that they should be placed on farms, homes of upright Christians, who would inspire repentance by good example, and who would benefit from the work these prisoners do as they await their judgment'' (Kent 2013:18 ). Blondal's words summarise the emerging prison-industrial complex, with significant utilisation of religion.
There is, however, a key difference between the emerging prisonindustrial complex and Agnes's stay on the farm, and that is the visibility of the convict, which makes her closer to "domestic'' animals than to modern prison inmates. This is that, as opposed to prisons which, according to Angela Davis, "do not disappear problems, they disappear human beings'', on the farm Agnes is visible, physical, material. Her ambiguous position in the family consisting of Margret, her husband Jon and their daughters Lauga and Steina, as well as several servants, reflects the position of "domestic''
animals, but it also complicates it with Agnes's closeness, with her "human form divine'' and her language. The position is liminal -between life and death -and contradictory: outside of legal protection yet extremely exposed to the law, with her work included in the society yet as a convicted criminal excluded from it. The problem that this legally animalised human being poses is conveyed by Margret's thinking about how she is to treat Agnes, as
Agnes is "not a servant, certainly no guest, and no pauper. She deserved no charity, and yet, she was condemned to die'' (45). Margret does not even know how to address Agnes: "It seems wrong to call her by a Christian name, Margret thought. What would they have called her in Stora-Borg, she wondered. Prisoner? Accused? Condemned? Perhaps it was the absence of a name, the silence where a name should be, that they had summoned her by'' (51). An unnamed living being condemned to die, more than a servant but certainly no guest, in significant ways -with her body -included in and excluded from the family economy: a cow or a sheep, but one who talks, and is listened to, first out of curiosity and later out of compassion.
The other crucial difference, in addition to Agnes's visibility and human appearance, is that while the technologies of "domestic'' animals, such as keeping, restraining, transportation and feeding, are all applied to Agnes, she is spared breeding. Quite the reverse the effect of law on Agnes's body is such that she has been virtually sterilised by the year of starvation and abuse in Stora-Borg: "I have stopped bleeding. I am no longer a woman'' (43). Yet Agnes's belief that she is no longer a woman does not mean she has stopped being ''meat'' for male consumption -as evidenced by her suggested disciplinary rapes. Ironically, while her reproductive capacity is not abused as is the case with female "domestic'' animals, she bleeds even more: not as a woman but as a physical, vulnerable, animal body to which she is reduced.
Finally, the scene of the execution, the last in the novel, is told from two perspectives which only together point to the complexity of living human beings, the horror of the death penalty, and the fact that a man or a woman before the law, which "always refers to the sword'' (Foucault/Rabinow 1984: 266) , is an animal in panic from pain, fighting, losing control over the bladder and the bowels: an animal, moreover, that has to be carried to the site of the execution. In Agnes's case it is precisely Toti who carries her because she cannot move her legs from fear.
Wholly human and wholly animal fear and physiological responses to the fast-approaching painful death are merely one aspect. In order to deliver Agnes's thoughts at the moment her death becomes a reality Kent reaches for striking metaphors:
Those who are not being dragged to their deaths cannot understand how the heart grows hard and sharp, until it is a nest of rocks with only an empty egg in it. I am barren; nothing will grow from me any more. I am the dead fish drying in the cold air. I am the dead bird on the shore. I am dry, I am not certain I will bleed when they drag me out to meet the axe. No, I am still warm, my blood still howls in my veins like the wind itself, and it shakes the empty nest and asks where all the birds have gone, where have they gone? (Kent 2013:301) The poetic language, it seems, is employed not so much for its own sake but to serve as a reminder that this is a complex, talented human being with a complex history of gender and class exploitation, marginalisation and resistance; with love, desires and language, who is legally reduced to the labels "criminal'', "the accused'', "the convicted'', and finally, by the very act of the execution, into a terrified animal, into a body subjected to extreme punishment. Ironically, the execution itself is performed as if in accordance with the "humane'' regulations which organise "the restraining, stunning and killing operations'' for the sake of "protecting animal welfare at slaughter'' 4 . The bound and terrified Agnes is given alcohol to drink, and the executioner performs the task "with dexterity and fearlessness'' (313); it is nonetheless painfully obvious that any animal's welfare at slaughter, including Agnes's, is nonexistent. however, it is only Agnes, as a human being, who is tried and legally sentenced to death. "Domestic'' animals are sentenced to the same death without a trial, and more importantly, without a crime. Even the term "sentenced'' is not fully appropriate because it implies the action of the law, and animals are wholly beyond the law -except as property. Yet Agnes, on the one extreme end of the law which ''always refers to the sword'', and animals, outside of it, are treated the same and end up the same, which leads to the conclusion that legal rituals have the power, as Dayan Colin puts it, to literally "make and unmake persons'': to produce the animalisation of those sentenced to death precisely by recognising them as human.
